Using eight annual surveys from the Netherlands between 2006 and 2013, we examine whether financial crisis experiences affect trust in banks, trust in the banking supervisor, and generalized trust. Adverse experiences during the financial crisis do not only directly lower trust in banks, but also have a negative effect on generalized trust. Customers of a bank that ran into problems have less trust in banks than respondents without this experience. Our results also indicate that respondents who were customer of a bank that failed have a significantly stronger decline of generalized trust than respondents without this experience. Personal financial crisis experiences do not have a significant effect on trust in the banking supervisor.
Introduction
Since the financial crisis started in 2007, the general public's trust in the financial system has strongly declined. In a July 2012 survey, Sapienza and Zingales find that only 21% of Americans trust the financial system, which is the lowest level of trust documented since early 2009. 5 A 2012 poll by Gallup shows that trust in financial institutions is especially low in Europe. In seven EU countries less than 30%
of the people trust banks or financial institutions, far below the median of 55% in a sample of 135 countries. Trust is the lowest among Greeks, where only 13% trust financial institutions. But also among Germans trust is low: only 38% have trust in their financial institutions. 6 Our paper contributes to the literature on trust by documenting the role of negative experiences with the financial sector during the crisis. First, using annual surveys among Dutch households, we study the effect of being a customer at a bank which ran into difficulties on trust in financial institutions, such as banks and the banking supervisor. For policymakers, it is important to understand which factors are related to shifts in trust in financial institutions. A sudden decline of trust in the financial sector may, for instance, threaten financial stability due to the increased likelihood of bank runs. Likewise, it may hamper financial intermediation.
Despite its importance, there is, so far, only limited research on the drivers of trust in financial institutions. Stevenson and Wolfers (2011) document how trust in a number of public institutions, including banks, has fallen sharply during the Great Recession, and point to rising unemployment as one possible factor for this development. Using data from various surveys, Guiso (2010) points to fraud, such as the Madoff case, as a reason for the collapse of trust. Knell and Stix (2009) identify subjective variables, such as individuals' assessment of their current and future financial positions, as important drivers of trust. Carbó-Valverde, Maqui-López and Ródriguez-Fernández (2013) find that trust is strongly affected by perceptions of several performance characteristics and attributes of banks. Ehrmann, Soudan and Stracca (2013) find that most of the fall of trust in the European Central Bank can be explained by pre-crisis determinants.
Second, we analyse whether the crisis experiences affect generalized trust. Generalized trust refers to cases in which there is no direct relationship between the person who trust and others. This form of trust can be contrasted with particularized trust, which arises when people are in direct contact with each other. Generalized trust, as a form of social capital, is regarded as crucial for the functioning of market economies (Arrow 1972 , Alesina and Ferrara 2002 , Putnam 1993 , Fukuyama 1995 Several studies find evidence of a positive relationship between trust and economic performance.
Using data from the World Values Survey for 29 market economies, Knack and Keefer (1997) Generalized trust is also related to other important variables, such as the quality of the government and corruption (see Horvath (2013) and Bjørnskov and Méon (2013) for further evidence and discussions of the literature). Recently, Sagnier (2013) finds that higher trust is correlated with lower macroeconomic volatility in a cross section of countries. Liang and Lim (2013) find that trust is an important determinant of a range of financial choices made by households, such as how much debt to take on, and whether or not to file for bankruptcy.
As far as we know, generalized trust has not been related directly to financial crisis experiences before. A number of studies have examined the determinants of generalized trust. Bjørnskov (2007) considers various potential determinants of cross-country differences in trust. He concludes that income inequality is the most important determinant of generalized trust. Gustavsson and Jordahl (2008) , using individual panel data from Swedish counties, also find that income inequality is an important driver of generalized trust. They also find that the proportion of foreign born within a geographical region is negatively related to trust. Based on data for U.S. localities, Alesina and Ferrara (2002) reach a similar conclusion. They also find that low trust is related to recent traumatic experiences, such as illness or divorce. Interesting for our study is their finding that financial misfortune is most closely associated with low trust.
We proceed as follows. First, using eight annual surveys on trust among Dutch households, we analyze the development of four different trust measures: (1) trust in other people (generalized trust), (2) how often one considers the possibility of a bank failing, (3) the liquidity of one's own bank compared to banks in general, and (4) trust in the banking supervisor.
We study the effect of personal crisis experiences on trust by relating our trust measures to a Overall, we find that adverse experiences during the financial crisis do not only directly affect trust in banks, but also have a negative effect on generalized trust. First, during the financial crisis trust in others, banks and the banking supervisor declined. Second, people who were customer of a bank that ran into difficulties during the crisis are more likely to have lost trust in others and trust in banks. Third, the decline of trust in the banking supervisor is not significantly related to direct crisis experiences.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology and data.
Section 3 shows the development of our trust measures over time, while section 4 examines their relationship with crisis experiences. Section 5 concludes.
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Methodology and data
Annual survey data
The analysis mainly builds on a number of annual surveys on trust which were submitted to members of the CentERpanel, a representative sample of the Dutch population. We combine these surveys with background variables available from the annual Dutch Household Survey (DHS), which also uses the to the 2,500 members of the panel. In the questionnaire for the 2010 wave, we added some additional questions on crisis experience. In the questionnaire for the 2013 wave, we included a set of additional questions on respondents' crisis experiences with respect to the nationalisation of SNS REAAL.
One potential concern regarding our data source is that participants may be aware that the survey is affiliated to De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) (i.e. the supervisor of financial institutions). However, in practice, all contacts with the survey participants are handled by CentERdata and it is not mentioned in our questionnaire that DNB has commissioned it. So, it seems more likely that participants associate the survey with the University of Tilburg rather than DNB.
Dependent variables
This paper connects the experience of respondents who were customer of an institution that either failed or had to be bailed out during the financial crisis to developments in trust. We construct four different measures of trust, which are all binary variables. We use the outcomes to the survey question "Generally
speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with
9 Information on the DHS is available at http://www.centerdata.nl/en/TopMenu/Projecten/DNB_household_study/index.html. URL last accessed on 21 March 2012. See also Teppa and Vis (2012) . The DHS has been used in several recent papers such as Van Rooij et al. (2011; and Van der Cruijsen et al. (2012) . Using DHS data, Mosch and Prast (2008) find that individuals with higher levels of trust in institutions also have greater confidence in the economy.
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people?" to construct our generalized trust variable (trust in other people). This question is very similar to the World Values Survey (WVS) question which is generally used to construct a measure of generalized trust. It is 1 for respondents who find that most people are to be trusted, and 0 for respondents who believe that one cannot be careful enough.
The variables thought about bank failure and view on bank liquidity measure trust in banks.
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Thought about bank failure is based on the answers to the question: "During the past year have you ever thought about the possibility that banks in the Netherlands might go bankrupt?" It is 1 for respondents who answered "now and then" or "very often", and 0 for respondents who answered "never" or "not often". To construct the variable view on bank liquidity, we use the outcomes of two questions: (1) "At the moment, do you trust that the bank(s) at which you have deposits is (are) able to repay these deposits at all times?" and (2) "In general, do you trust that banks in the Netherlands are able to repay deposits at all times?" Answers were recoded such that respondents score from 1 (no, completely not) to 5 (yes, completely) on each question. Then we subtracted the score on question 2 from the score on question 1.
For respondents who find the liquidity of their own bank better than the liquidity of banks in general the outcome is larger than 0. In that case the variable view on bank liquidity is 1, and else it is 0.
Our final trust measure is trust in banking supervisor. It uses the answers to the survey question "How much trust do you have in De Nederlandsche Bank?" Trust in banking supervisor is 1 for respondents who answered "a lot of trust" or "pretty much trust" and 0 for respondents who answered "not so much trust" and "absolutely no trust".
Variables for crisis experience
Using the 2010 and 2013 survey outcomes, we construct three crisis variables: year after bailout, year after bankruptcy, and bailout in 2013. In 2010 we asked the respondents whether they were a customer of a bank which went bankrupt or received government support in the three years preceding the survey. In 7 2013 we asked respondents whether they had savings at ASN Bank, SNS Bank, and/or RegioBank, which were all part of SNS REAAL which was nationalized in 2013. Appendix 1 lists the relevant questions.
Year after bailout is a dummy that is 1 for respondents who were customer of a bank that was bailed out in the previous year, and 0 else. In 2009 year after bailout is 1 for 44% of the respondents.
Similarly, year after bankruptcy is a dummy that is 1 for respondents who were customer of a bank that went bankrupt in the previous year, and 0 else. In 2009 year after bankruptcy was 1 for 4% of the respondents and in 2010 it was 1 for 7% of the respondents. Bailout in 2013 is a dummy that is 1 in 2013
for respondents who were customer of ASN Bank, SNS Bank, and/or RegioBank, and 0 else. Bailout in 2013 is 1 for 14% of the respondents.
Control variables
We analyze the effects of adverse crisis experiences while controlling for a set of other factors. We have a rich set of background characteristics from the DHS, which we use to construct control variables. We include: age (measured using 3 categories), male, income, education, house owner, handles finance. For age, we use three 0-1 dummy variables: i) younger than 35, ii) between 45 and 64, iii) older than 65. The baseline category are respondents between 35 and 44. Male is a dummy that is one if the respondent is male. Income is the gross monthly household income category, which ranges from 1 (500 euro or less) to 12 (7,500 euro or more). Education is a dummy that is 1 for respondents who successfully completed higher vocational education and/or university education, and 0 otherwise. Handles finance is a dummy variable that is 1 for respondents responsible for the household's financial affairs and 0 otherwise, while house owner is a rough proxy for the level of wealth; it is 1 for respondents owning a house, and 0 otherwise.
Regression specification and selection of sample period
We analyze the effects of crisis experiences by estimating random effects probit regressions using the four trust measures as dependent variables. We run two sets of regressions by distinguish two time However, we prefer running the two sets of regressions separately. There is a substantial degree of panel attrition between the surveys on crisis experiences in 2010 and 2013, leading to a loss of about 800 out of 2000 observations. This raises a concern about the representativeness of the sample. We especially lose a large portion of the individuals who report having experienced a bankruptcy. Thus, we would have to draw conclusions on a relatively small set of individuals with this type of crisis experience.
Trust in others, banks and the banking supervisor
Trust in other people
The top-left panel of Figure 1 shows the share of people who find that most other people are to be trusted.
It is based on the outcomes of the survey question: "Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?" Since the outbreak of the crisis, trust in others decreased; the share of respondents trusting other people declined from 70% in 2009 to 65% in 2010. In 2013, generalized trust returned to its pre-crisis level of 69%.
(Insert Figure 1 about here) Trust in banks
Due to the financial crisis public trust in financial institutions declined too. The top right panel of Figure   1 shows the mean response to the question: "During the past year have you ever thought about the possibility that banks in the Netherlands might go bankrupt?" which is measured on a scale between 1 (never) and 4 (quite often). People have started to think more frequently about the possibility of bankruptcy of banks. The increase was especially strong after the first years of the crisis when several banks in the Netherlands either failed or were bailed out.
The bottom left panel summarizes trust in the liquidity of one's own bank compared to banks in general. For the whole period respondents, on average, trust their own bank more than banks in general.
However, there is significant variation over time. After the start of the crisis, relative trust in one's own bank increased. This is because trust in the liquidity of banks in general declined more than trust in the liquidity of one's own bank. However, more recently trust in the liquidity of one's own bank declined more than trust in the liquidity of banks in general.
Trust in the banking supervisor
The bottom right panel of Figure 1 
Explaining trust: regression results
and 2009 crisis experiences
First, we analyze to what extent the experiences of respondents during the early crisis had an impact on our trust measures. Table 1 shows average marginal effects based on random effects probit regressions using four different trust measures as dependent variable: trust in other people (column 1), thought about bank failure (column 2), view on bank liquidity (column 3), and trust in banking supervisor (column 4). Table 1 Gender is not significantly related to trust in banks and trust in the banking supervisor. Compared to poorer people, richer people are more likely to trust the banking supervisor and other people. The latter findings is in line with the outcomes of previous research (e.g. Van Oorschot et al., 2006, Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002) . Trust in the banking supervisor and other people is also relatively high for (1) houseowners in comparison to people who do not own a house, (2) more educated respondents in comparison to less educated respondents (which is a well-established finding in the literature, see Hooghe et al., 2012) , and (3) respondents who take care of household finances in comparison to other respondents.
(Insert
However, more educated people are more likely to consider the possibility of bank failure than less educated people and house owners are less positive about the relative liquidity position of their bank than people who don't own a house.
crisis experience
We also examine whether the recent crisis experience, i.e., the nationalisation of ASN Bank, SNS Bank and RegioBank, had an effect on trust. (column 4).
(Insert Table 2 about here)
This more recent crisis experience also significantly affected trust. The results are in line with those presented in table 1. Again, respondents who were customers of a bank that was bailed out are less positive about the relative liquidity position of their own bank than respondents without this experience.
Again, there is no significant relationship between the crisis experience and trust in the banking supervisor. In line with the findings reported in Table 1 , generalized trust is not significantly affected by the experience of a bail out.
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The outcomes on the covariates generally confirm the findings reported in Table 1 . In addition, they show that in 2013 males were significantly less likely to think about the possibility of a bank failure than females. The same holds for respondents who handle their household's finances in comparison to respondents who don't. Furthermore, the outcomes show that better educated respondents and 12 respondents in charge of household finances are more positive about the relative liquidity position of their bank than less educated respondents and respondent who are not responsible for handling the household's finances.
Conclusions
Using eight years of survey data from the Netherlands, we examine whether their financial crisis experiences affected respondents' trust in banks and the banking supervisor, as well as generalized trust.
Our results suggest that customers of a bank that was bailed out are less positive about the relative liquidity position of their own bank than customers without this experience; in addition, they are more likely to have considered the possibility of bank failure than respondents without this experience.
Customers of a bank that failed are also more likely to consider the possibility of a bank failure. In addition, our results suggest that even though trust in the banking supervisor declined after the start of the financial crisis, personal financial crisis experiences do not have an additional effect on trust in the banking supervisor. In contrast, generalized trust is affected by respondents' crisis experiences:
respondents who were customer of a bank that failed indicate a significantly stronger decline of generalized trust than respondents without this experience.
Our findings therefore suggest that negative crisis experiences have at least two detrimental effects. First, they reduce trust in the financial sector thereby threating financial stability due to the increased likelihood of bank runs and possibly undermining financial intermediation. Second, they reduce generalized trust, which may reduce economic growth.
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Van In the first part of this questionnaire you will first be asked a few questions about trust in general and then a few questions about trust in financial institutions. In the second part of this questionnaire you will be asked questions on banking supervision. In this questionnaire you can't scroll back to the previous question.
Q1
Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in 
